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Affective Dispositions And Cognitive Skills In Critical Thinking: 
Implications For Measurement, Training, And Team Performance 
 
Timothy John Willis 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This study attempts to increase critical thinking among teams by making them 
cognizant of seven critical thinking dimensions.  Forty three-person teams of 
undergraduates worked together on a complex decision-making task.  Each team received 
training in and was asked to ensure their group exhibited the characteristics of cognitive 
skills, affective dispositions, both of these or neither. Critical thinking was assessed using 
self-report, behavioral observation rating, and expert outcome analysis.  The findings 
suggest training in affective dispositions increases the exhibition of at least one 
dimensions of critical thinking.  A behavioral measurement is presented and evaluated 
with respect to established critical thinking methods.  
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 The teaching techniques of Socrates, whereby probing questions are asked of 
students to lead them toward knowledge, are often cited as the first recorded instance of 
critical thinking (Fasko, 2003).  Descartes subsequently helped move the study of the 
mind from the realm of theology to the realm of pre-science by suggesting thinking is the 
property of the mind, and as such it is endowed with certain innate knowledge (Schultz & 
Schultz, 1996).  Two hundred years later, however, John Locke proposed the notion that 
the mind without experience was a tabula rasa, or blank slate.  He believed ideas were a 
result of experience and complex ideas were simply many simple ideas joined together 
(Fasko, 2003).  Regardless of with whom you agreed, it was clear the scientific study of 
thought had begun. 
The nineteenth century saw rise to modern psychology and with it new ways of 
explaining thinking.  Beginning with Wilhelm Wundt, and continuing with Edward 
Titchener, thinking was assessed and explored using introspection.  Titchener proposed 
an elaborate structure of consciousness comprising three states: sensations, images, and 
affective states (Schultz & Schultz, 1996).  John B. Watson later denied even the 
existence of a consciousness; he believed thinking was nothing more than sub-vocal 
speech (Fasko, 2003).  With the very existence of thinking in question, it seemed a 
complete change in perspective was needed. 
And so it seemed everything from physics to psychology was beginning to shift 
from the reductionistic introspection associated with Wundt and Titchener toward the 
more integrative school of gestalt.  Led by Wertheimer, Kohler, and Koffka, the gestalt 
school viewed thinking as an active, constructive process.  This active view of thought 
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was later influenced by the burgeoning interest in computer technology, and led naturally 
to the information-processing model of thinking that was prevalent in the 1960s.  This 
model provides a functional, organized framework for understanding mental processes 
using the processes of attention, encoding and retrieval, and is evocative of the model 
used to understand the way computers processes information.  In the early 1980s, the 
information-processing model evolved into a more involved, more active thought 
process—a framework ideally suited to the investigation of critical thinking (Fasko, 
2003). 
In part in response to the newly active, involved thought process models that were 
being proposed during this time, many researchers became increasingly aware of the 
automatic aspects of human thinking.  In order to survive in an increasingly hostile world, 
humans have developed the ability to simplify their existence somewhat through 
automation.  Several theories of the process by which this occurs were developed in part 
to help explain why some situations elicit a reasoned response from someone while other 
situations are responded to automatically.  One automaticity theory suggests that as a 
person begins to learn a particular skill, he or she works through mental processing 
algorithms (Logan, 1988).  For example, during the beginning of her stay in a foreign 
land, a traveler might perform a mental conversion of the price of items in a store to her 
home currency each time she makes a purchase.  Eventually she will recall from memory 
rather than calculate prices for items frequently purchased.  In this way, active 
computation has been reduced or eliminated and the much less effortful process of 
memory retrieval provides the information previously acquired through computation. 
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 Another form of automaticity involves the caching of solutions to common 
problems.  In much the same way people use shortcuts and automatic means of 
information processing, so too can they cache solutions to common problems for use at a 
later time.  In fact, we can use the knowledge of a person’s tendencies to use the same 
solutions over and over in similar situations to predict their behavior (Markman & 
Gentner, 2001).   
Through the process of categorization people classify things into categories and 
draw inferences from those categories.  Categorization can be divided into domain-
general processes such as the role of similarity, or domain-specific processes such as in 
the study of cross-cultural differences in categorization (Markman & Gentner, 2001).  
The concept of similarity refers to the comparing of stimulus objects with prototype 
objects in order to categorize new objects.  These stored category prototypes are 
comprised of the most typical features of the members of the category it represents; new 
objects are placed into categories according to their similarity to the prototype.  
 
Mental Models 
In an attempt to understand how humans perceive and interact with their 
environment, scientists rely heavily on the concept of the mental model as a framework 
for understanding certain cognitive processes.  Markman and Gentner (2001) broadly 
define mental models as “representation[s] of some domain or situation that supports 
understanding, reasoning, or prediction” (p.229), yet this definition is far from 
incontrovertible, and has been criticized as being so general that it does not accurately 
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differentiate mental models from knowledge systems.  Rouse and Morris (1986) review 
several alternative definitions of mental models, recognizing that most theories are 
developed to explain a specific situation or phenomenon, and provide a general 
definition: a mental model is a “mechanism whereby humans generate descriptions of 
system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and observed system states, 
and predictions of future system states” (p. 360).   Mental models have been theorized to 
help individuals predict and explain behavior, draw inferences and make predictions, 
determine appropriate actions, recognize and remember relationships among system 
variables, understand expectations, and organize and process new information in a rapid 
and flexible manner (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). 
Two types of mental models are generally recognized: logical mental models and 
causal mental models.  People form logical mental models in order to organize complex 
series of items and relationships when engaging in logical reasoning tasks.  These models 
are developed as a way of organizing and categorizing information for a specific task, 
and are discarded after the task has been accomplished.  Causal mental models, on the 
other hand, are mental representations used in reasoning that are based on long-term 
knowledge or theories.  An example of this type of mental model is a mental simulation 
of events yet to occur.  These simulations are qualitative rather than quantitative, in that 
they use imagery rather than calculations.   
Hegarty and Just (1993) studied the processes by which people form mental 
models.  They measured the time it took for individuals to solve a mechanical 
comprehension test when given a textual description, a diagrammatic description, or both.  
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They found evidence that subjects in all conditions were constructing mental models of 
the mechanical system they were asked to explain, but the group that was given text and 
diagrams performed better than those given one or the other.  Subsequent eye-fixation 
analysis showed the readers were constructing mental models incrementally by reading 
and re-reading a line of text before integrating that information with the diagram.  These 
diagram consultations are thus seen as elaborative--an aid in the formation of a mental 
model rather than as an aid in understating the text. 
Although mental models are generally thought to be cognitive phenomena, there 
is some evidence that they have a motor component as some mental simulations have 
been linked to bodily movement.  Schwartz and Black (1999) asked people to mentally 
simulate tilting either a wide or a narrow glass as far as they could without spilling the 
water it contained.  They found people were usually quite inaccurate when asked to 
visualize and report how far they could tilt each glass, but when they closed their eyes 
and tilted empty glasses they were much more likely to report the correct angle.  Kathleen 
Metz (1985) found children often used hand motions to simulate the motion of a turning 
gear when asked to predict in which direction a specific gear will rotate.  Eventually the 
children developed decision rules (e.g. each gear turns the opposite direction from the 
one adjacent), and made decisions based on rules rather than mental simulations.  These 
decision rules reduce or eliminate the need to engage in mental simulation by utilizing 
previously stored information, thereby reducing cognitive load.  Gentner and Medina 
(1998) argue that the comparison of two or more mental representations allows for the 
extension and application of abstract knowledge from one setting to another.  The more 
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similar the mental representations are to one another the more likely it is that knowledge 
will be extended and connections between concepts strengthened by the formation of a 
new decision rule.  If two mental representations are very dissimilar it is likely that a new 
decision rule will not be formed, knowledge will not transfer from one model to the 
other, and there will be no decrease in cognitive load. 
Mental models are also studied at the team level, though not without controversy.  
Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) provide a review of studies supporting and refuting the 
idea that teams can share a mental model or form a “shared cognition” (p.406).  Klimoski 
and Mohammed also discuss the relative lack of empirical evidence with regard to group 
cognition, and cite as cause the difficulties in collecting such data.  Endsley (1995), 
however, provides evidence suggesting shared mental models can be accurately assessed 
using self-report and behavioral observation methods.  Training is also an integral factor 
in the relationship between mental models and team performance.  Rouse, Cannon-
Bowers, and Salas (1992) provide evidence that training teams to develop appropriate 
expectations of likely team behaviors and explanations of observed team behaviors 
enhances mental models and therefore improves performance.  Cannon-Bowers, Salas, 
and Converse (1993) suggest cross-training team members may help them understand the 
roles and responsibilities of their teammates, and training team leaders to share their 
views of the task with their team may help standardize the mental model for the group.   
In summary, though the definition of mental models may be in flux, there is no 
question as to their usefulness in understanding and explaining the way individuals and 
groups organize and retrieve information.  There is clear evidence that mental models are 
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formed spontaneously and rapidly, and are revised as new information becomes 
available.   There is evidence that suggests mental models may have a motor component, 
and that physical movement can aid in the formation of models.  Mental models assist in 
the development of decision rules that guide future decisions and reduce cognitive load.  
Though the study of team mental models has been stymied by the relative difficulties in 
measurement, familiar methods are gaining credence from empirical studies and new 
techniques are being developed to address this issue. 
 
Critical Thinking 
The study of critical thinking has been plagued by the lack of a unanimously 
agreed-upon conception of the term.  In fact, it has been said that there are as many 
definitions of critical thinking as there are experts in the field (Benderson, 1990).  Fasko 
(2003) reviews nearly two dozen such definitions coming from the fields of education, 
philosophy, and psychology.  Each of these fields includes in their list of crucial 
characteristics for critical thinking a slightly different set of behaviors, thoughts, and 
qualities, and there is a great deal of disagreement regarding the underlying processes and 
key requirements for something to be considered critical thinking.  John Dewey 
developed the first universal definition of what we now call critical thinking when he 
proposed his notion of reflective thinking, which is the “active, persistent, and careful 
consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds 
that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends… [It] includes conscious and 
voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of evidence and rationality” (Dewey, 
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1933, p. 9).  Dewey further restricted his definition to say that “efforts to establish beliefs 
based on evidence and rationality” (p. 9) could only be considered critical thinking if they 
were both conscious and voluntary. 
In what may be the most thorough attempt to obtain consensus to date, a panel of 
experts in critical thinking instruction, assessment, and theory was convened in February 
of 1988 to systematically study the nature and assessment of critical thinking (Facione, 
1990).  Over the next seventeen months, these forty-six experts used the Delphi technique 
(Linstone & Turoff, 1975), an iterative, collaborative process often used to reach 
consensus on conceptual definition or other problems not amenable to more quantitative 
inquiry, to define the criteria of elements comprising critical thinking.  Their findings 
resulted in the identification of an affective disposition component to critical thinking and 
a cognitive skill component (Facione, 1990).  This two-factor model of critical thinking 
that was developed through expert consensus was later buttressed by empirical research.  
Taube (1997) tested college students’ educational values, need for cognition, ambiguity 
tolerance, and critical thinking ability (as measured by the Watson-Glaser Critical 
Thinking Appraisal and the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test).  They also 
collected college GPA and SAT verbal and math scores.  Confirmatory factor analysis 
showed the two-factor (ability and disposition) model provides a better fit with the 
obtained data than a one-factor model (GFI = .955 versus .869, respectively).  Taube 
cautions that general mental ability may be partly or largely influencing the critical 
thinking ability score.  In fact, the factor loadings of SAT-math and SAT-verbal on the 
critical thinking dimension were both higher than the Watson-Glaser measure, and the 
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Ennis-Weir test’s loading on the ability factor of the two-factor was more than double its 
loading on the disposition factor, though it was assumed it would measure both critical 
thinking ability and disposition. 
The study of critical thinking is unfortunately somewhat intertwined with the 
concept of intelligence.  We cannot in good conscious discuss critical thinking without at 
least acknowledging its relationship with g.  g is defined as “the ability to deal with 
complexity” (Gottfredson, p.29), and as such must be included in the discussion of 
critical thinking at least as it is measured by complex tasks.   There is evidence, however, 
that other forms of intelligence such as tacit knowledge or practical intelligence may 
predict performance on situational judgment tests or simulation exercises (a common 
method for assessing critical thinking) better than g (Sternberg & Hedlund, 2002).   
The first major documented case of the assessment of critical thinking resulted 
from an experiment Edward Glaser conducted to assess the thinking skills of high school 
students (Glaser, 1941).  He identified three components of critical thinking: a disposition 
to carefully consider the problems one encounters, knowledge of logical reasoning 
methods, and the ability to apply those methods.  These findings became the beginnings 
of a stream of research that would lead to the eventual development of the Watson-Glaser 
Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 1980).  Glaser, now armed with a tool to 
assess his success, set out to teach critical thinking.  His training program consisted of 
eight lessons related to critical thinking, such as evidence, attitude, prejudice, and the 
scientific method.  He obtained evidence suggesting the successful teaching of critical 
thinking in that the group that had received his training performed significantly better 
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than the group that did not, but his findings were tempered by the subsequent realization 
that the obtained critical thinking scores were significantly correlated with intelligence 
measures (.46) and reading comprehension (.77) (Facione, 1984). 
Since that time critical thinking has been studied in nearly every academic 
discipline, particularly nursing (see Simpson & Courtney, 2002 for a review) and 
education (e.g. Meyers 1996). 
 
Critical Thinking in Industrial and Organizational Psychology 
 One of the ways critical thinking is linked directly to industrial and organizational 
psychology is through task complexity.   Task complexity is invariably linked to critical 
thinking because the ability to successfully engage a complex task often requires a degree 
of intelligence and the ability to think critically.  The impact that general mental 
processing ability (g) has on performance is evident in everyday tasks but is most evident 
in “higher order thinking skills such as reasoning, abstract thinking, and problem solving” 
(Gottfredson, 2002, p.27).  These higher order thinking skills are among those generally 
considered requisite of critical thinking (Fasko, 2003; Facione, 1990).   
 Performance management and assessment are often troublesome in even simple 
jobs, but the task is exponentially more difficult when the performance to be assessed 
involves critical thinking.  Molleman and Timmerman (2003) found it difficult to assess 
the knowledge and skills requisite of some of the complex jobs they assessed, in part due 
to the high degree of creativity and specialization.  They also found a great deal of 
teamwork among those workers who thought critically as part of their jobs, and therefore 
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stress the importance of being aware of the influence of team members when assessing 
the performance of those workers who are likely to think critically.   
 
Cognitive Skills and Critical Thinking 
 Six cognitive skills are thought to be employed by good critical thinkers: analysis, 
evaluation, explanation, inference, interpretation, and self-regulation (Facione, 1990, see 
Table 1).  These six skills are thought to be as trainable and teachable as other skills.  In 
fact, research has long been conducted in the fields of education and nursing regarding 
training and evaluating critical thinking skills in students and nurses (for a review of the 
education literature see Meyers, 1986; for a review of the nursing literature see Simpson 
& Courtney, 2002).   
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Table 1 
Cognitive skills of critical thinkers (Facione, 1990).   
Dimension Description 
  
Analysis Identifying the intended and actual inferential relationships 
among statements intended to express belief, judgment, 
experiences, reasons, information, or opinions 
Evaluation Assessing the credibility of statements or other representations, 
and to assess the logical strength of the actual or intended 
inferential relationships among those statements. 
Explanation Justifying and explaining one’s reasoning in terms of the 
evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, and 
contextual considerations upon which one’s results were based. 
Inference Identifying and securing elements needed to draw reasonable 
conclusions.  Forming conjectures and hypotheses, considering 
relevant information and resulting consequences. 
Interpretation Comprehending and expressing the meaning or significance of a 
wide variety of experiences, situations, data, events, judgments, 
conventions, beliefs, rules, procedures, or criteria. 
Self-regulation Monitoring the elements and the results of one’s cognitive 
activities.  Applying the skills of analysis and evaluation to 
one’s own inferential judgments with a view toward 
questioning, confirming, validating, or correcting one’s 
reasoning or results. 
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Affective Dispositions and Critical Thinking 
Although cognitive skills and situational factors influence the ability of someone 
to think critically, it does not explain why some people seem to think critically often in a 
given situation while others rarely do.  If someone has all the requisite skills to think 
critically but fails to do so, and a situational explanation cannot be found, it stands to 
reason that there is a dispositional explanation for the lack of critical thinking.   Based on 
this observation, scientists and educators began looking for those internal factors which 
cause an otherwise capable individual to engage in critical thinking or not.  They were 
looking for the “critical spirit” of the critical thinker, that way of living that is consistent 
with critical thinking (Facione, 1998).  It was agreed that critical thinkers are analytical, 
inquisitive, judicious, open-minded, systematic, truth-seeking and possess cognitive 
maturity (see table 2).   
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Table 2 
Affective dimensions of critical thinking (Facione, Sanchez, & Facione, 1994).   
Dimension Description 
  
Analyticity Prizing the application of reasoning and the use of evidence to 
resolve problems, anticipating potential conceptual or practical 
difficulties and consistently being alert to the need to intervene 
Inquisitiveness Being intellectually curious and possessing a desire to learn 
even when the application of the knowledge is not readily 
apparent 
Open-mindedness Being tolerant of divergent views and sensitive to the 
possibility of one’s own bias 
Systematicity Being organized, orderly, focused and diligent in inquiry 
Truth-seeking Being eager to seek the best knowledge in a given context, 
courageous about asking questions, and honest and objective 
about pursuing inquiry even if the findings do not support 
one’s self-interests or preconceived notions. 
Cognitive Maturity Trusting one’s own reasoning processes and the ability to lead 
others in the rational resolution of problems 
Judiciousness Approaching problems, inquiry, and decision-making with a 
sense that some problems are necessarily ill-structured, and 
many times judgments must be made on standards, contexts 
and evidence which preclude certainty.   
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Training 
 Though there have been many advances in the study of training throughout the 
last twenty years, three factors consistently emerge: needs assessment, training 
methodology, and training evaluation.  According to Wexley (1984), needs assessment 
answers three questions: where should training be placed, what needs to be trained, and 
who needs the training?  Latham (1988) provides four methods for identifying training 
needs: organization analysis, task analysis, person analysis, and demographic analysis.  In 
conducting an organization analysis the training program is linked to the goals of the 
organization and is designed to minimize the technical obsolescence of the organization’s 
members.  The task analysis evaluates the tasks that the recipients of the training will be 
required to do, taking care to anticipate the requirements of the job likely in the near 
future.  A person analysis is conducted to determine who needs training.  Interviews with 
trainers and managers, surveys, and self-nomination are all methods of conducting person 
analyses.  A demographic analysis is conducted to determine the training needs of entire 
populations of workers.  These studies are often inter-organizational and focus on groups 
such as workers over fifty or on female managers (Latham, 1988). 
 A successful training method is designed to achieve four goals: presentation of 
relevant information or concepts to be learned, demonstration of the knowledge, skills, 
and abilities (KSAs) to be learned, create opportunities for trainees to practice the skills, 
and provide feedback to trainees during and after practice.  (Salas & Canon-Bowers, 
2001).  Training methodology is constantly evolving.  Computer-based training has been 
used for approximately twenty years, and has been consistently successful (Wexley, 
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1984), though now when we talk of computer-based training we are usually speaking of 
distributed or distance learning.  The convenience and savings of time and money that 
Web-based training programs offer make them an attractive alternative to more 
traditional methods.  These new tools have greatly impacted the way training is 
conducted, but we don’t know as much about the learning processes that occur with the 
use of these media as we do about face-to-face classroom training (i.e., what level of 
interaction between trainer and student is needed for effective knowledge transfer and 
retention?) (Salas and Canon-Bowers, 2001).  In addition to computer-based training, 
simulators and simulation games are very popular training methods.  Though the 
cognitive processes and training design of these methods have been largely ignored, 
simulation and behavior role modeling are usually effective in producing immediate 
training effects as well as long-term retention (Salas and Canon-Bowers, 2001).     
 
Training Critical Thinking 
There is a great deal of interest in training people to be good critical thinkers.  
Nearly everyone, from teachers to employers to military leaders has an interest in 
developing the critical thinking skills of their charges.  Latham (1988) predicted “jobs of 
the future will require less memorizing of facts and procedures, fewer physical skills, and 
far more conceptual ability” (p.550).  There is little disagreement that cognitive skills can 
be trained; these are seen as developable skills in much the same way artistic or 
leadership skills can be developed (Facione, Facione and Giancarlo, 2000).  Where there 
is disagreement, however, is in whether affective dispositions can be trained.  That is, can 
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we train someone to behave in a manner that is consistent with a disposition toward 
critical thinking?  Perkins and Tishman (1993) argue that the engagement in critical 
thinking is indicative of a disposition toward critical thinking, but their argument requires 
the ability for people to choose their activity.  We hope to determine whether people, 
given the knowledge of critical thinking dispositions, can perform the behaviors 
associated with these dispositions in the context of thinking critically.   
 
Hypotheses 
1. Teams receiving instruction in the use of affective dispositions and cognitive skills 
will exhibit these characteristics more during a critical-thinking task. 
a. Teams in the cognitive skills condition will use cognitive skills to a greater 
extent than teams in the control or affective dispositions condition, as 
measured by both the behavioral and self-report ratings.   
b. Teams receiving training in affective dispositions will use affective 
dispositions to a greater extent than teams in the control or cognitive skills 
condition, as measured by both the behavioral and self-report ratings.   
c. Teams receiving both cognitive skills training and affective dispositions 
training will use both affective dispositions and cognitive skills to a greater 
extent than teams in the control condition, as measured by both the behavioral 
and self-report ratings.   
2. Behavioral measures of cognitive skills will correlate with the self-report measure of 
cognitive skills. 
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3. Behavioral measures of affective disposition correlate with the self-report measure of 
affective disposition 
4. Teams displaying evidence of affective dispositions and cognitive skills perform 
better on critical-thinking tasks.   
a. The expert performance rating will be significantly and positively correlated 
with the affective dispositions self-report score. 
b. The expert performance rating will be significantly and positively correlated 
with the affective dispositions behavioral observation score. 
c. The expert performance rating will be significantly and positively correlated 
with the cognitive skills self-report score. 
d. The expert performance rating will be significantly and positively correlated 
with the cognitive skills behavioral observation score. 
5. Affective dispositions are closely related to the personality variable openness to 
experience.  
a. The behavioral measure of affective disposition will be highly correlated with 
the personality measure of openness to experience. 
b. The self-report measure of affective disposition will be highly correlated with 
the personality measure for openness to experience.   
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred-twenty students self-selected into the study from the USF 
Psychology Subject Pool.  The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 50, averaged 
21.9 years (SD=5.13), with a median of 20.  Each subject had worked an average of 4.74 
years (SD=3.83), ranging from zero to twenty years.  The median number of years of 
work experience was four.  Participants worked in three-person teams and were given 
extra-credit in their classes in consideration of their participation. 
 
Materials 
Tactical Decision Games 
We used a modified version of two Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) reprinted from The 
Marine Corps Gazette (Schmitt, 1994). These paper-based scenarios are used by military 
leaders as instructional aids to teach tactics, operations, and strategy.  The TDGs were 
modified to remove military terms that would hinder their understanding by non-military 
undergraduate students and then used to stimulate and measure critical thinking.   
Exit Questionnaire 
This is a 26-item questionnaire developed by the researchers.  It asked participants to rate 
the performance of their group in effective team functioning, cognitive skills, and 
affective dispositions.  Participants indicated their agreement to questions such as “My 
team had clear agreement on priorities” on a five-point Likert scale anchored at strongly 
disagree and strongly agree. 
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Personality Measure
 This 60-item measure was developed with questions from the international 
personality item pool.  It is comprised of the 50-item “Big Five Domain” scale and the 
10-item “Openness to Experience” scale (Goldberg, 1999). 
TinkerToy® project 
 TinkerToys® are a children’s toy made of wooden rods and connecting pieces.  
Three 66-piece junior builder TinkerToy® sets were combined, then divided into groups 
of like shape and function and placed into new bins.  One bin contained all connector 
pieces, another all long rods, and the last bin contained medium-sized rods and wheels. 
 
Procedure 
Each team was welcomed and told they will be studying team dynamics during problem-
solving tasks.  After informed consent, consent to videotape, and demographic 
information was gathered, the participants were asked to read along while listening to an 
informative audio recording.  Depending on condition, participants received instruction in 
either cognitive skills used in critical thinking, affective dispositions of critical thinkers, 
both of these, or neither of these.  Those groups that did not receive training in both 
cognitive skills and affective dispositions listened to training tapes on choosing college 
classes or conducting a job search, such that they will have listened to a total of two 
training tapes.  
 Assignment cards were then distributed to those groups who had listened to the 
cognitive skills tape and/or the affective dispositions tape.  These cards list one of the 
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cognitive skills or affective dispositions and its definition.  Participants were instructed to 
ensure the group engages in the skill or disposition they had been given.  Teams received 
a short training on effective teams and team building.   
 Each team was then asked to complete an “icebreaker” exercise, designed to 
enable communication and cooperation, in which they built a tower of TinkerToys®.  The 
participants were reminded of the qualities of effective teams before the task began.  
Teams were given one of the bins of TinkerToys and were instructed to build a tower as 
tall as possible within fifteen minutes.  They were limited by the inability to touch only 
the pieces that came from their bin; they were not allowed to touch their teammates’ 
pieces.  A discussion followed during which the team members examined their team and 
individual performance and the degree to which they used their assignment cards and 
reminded the group to exhibit the listed characteristics.  They then discussed ways to 
improve in future tasks, and were reminded of their assignment to ensure the group 
exhibits the characteristics on their cards. 
 Next, participants were given their first Tactical Decision Game (TDG).  The 
group was again reminded of effective habits of teams, and was then presented with the 
scenario and answer sheets.  The group was asked to determine and prioritize their goals, 
issue orders and justifications to the people under their command, and to use a map to 
provide a visual aid to assist the researchers in understanding their solution.  Teams 
engaged in a discussion after the scenario in which they evaluated their performance and 
reminded to use their assignment cards in the next task.    
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 The second TDG was given in the same manner as the first, with a reminder of 
the qualities of effective teams.  This scenario lasts up to an hour and is videotaped.  The 
participants then each completed a personality measure, and an exit questionnaire.    
 
Scoring 
SME Rating 
A military expert used a five-point scale to rate the military effectiveness of the 
orders given in each team’s solution to the second TDG.  This score serves as an 
objective measure of task performance based on performance-relevant criteria.   
Behavioral Rating 
After training to an acceptable level of agreement, three graduate students 
individually viewed and rated the videotape of the second TDG of each group.  The 
frequency of exhibition of each of the six cognitive skills and seven affective dispositions 
were made, as well as an overall rating (one to five) on each of these 13 dimensions.   
Self-report 
 Team members were asked to complete a 24-item questionnaire assessing the 
degree to which their team engaged in each of the thirteen affective dispositions and 
cognitive skills, and assessed the degree to which the team members engaged in effective 
team processes. 
Results 
The ratings of the three judges completing the behavioral ratings of cognitive 
skills and affective dispositions evidence a high level of inter-judge agreement (type C 
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intraclass correlation coefficient  = 0.87).  A one-way between-subjects multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) including the TDG expert rating, all the 34 
dependent variables and three covariates listed in table 3 achieved multivariate 
significance (F(90,246) = 1.647, p=0.001).  The covariates of age, gender, and work 
experience, however, were not significant (F(30,80) = 0.603, p>0.05;  F(30,80) = 0.792, 
p>0.05;  F(30,80) = 1.116, p>0.05, respectively), and were thus removed from future 
analysis.  A one-way between-subjects multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
run on the remaining variables.  This resulted in an overall significant main effect for 
experimental condition (F(90,252) = 1.551, p<0.01).  Subsequent univariate analysis 
revealed a significant main effect for condition on subject matter expert (SME) ratings. 
(F(3,113)=5.784, p<.001).  A Games-Howell post-hoc analysis of the SME ratings reveals 
the cognitive condition and the control condition scored higher than the affective group 
condition (mean difference=0.7761, p<0.001 and 0.3937, p<0.05, respectively).  
The overall behavioral ratings of each team reveal a difference among teams with 
regard to the affective disposition of truth-seeking.  Those teams that received affective 
dispositions training (M=3.62, SD=0.846) received a higher overall rating on the truth-
seeking dimension of the behavioral rating than did the control group (M=2.88, 
SD=0.878).  The Games-Howell test shows this difference is significant at the p<.01 
level.  The behavioral ratings show a strong correspondence with the subject matter 
expert ratings (r=0.80, p<.01), such that more behavioral expression of cognitive skills 
and affective dispositions was associated with better solutions to the problem scenario as 
judged by the subject matter expert.
  
Figure 1 
Subject matter expert ratings by training condition. 
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Figure 2  
Behavioral observation of Truthseeking dimension by training condition. 
25 
  
26 
Table 3 
Variables used in multivariate analysis of covariance. 
Independent  
Variable (1) 
Experimental condition  
(training in cognitive skills, affective dispositions, both, or neither) 
Dependent  
Variables (37) 
 
TDG expert rating (1) 
 
Behavioral ratings (30) 
a. Frequencies of affective dispositions exhibited, by dimension 
(7) 
b. Frequencies of cognitive skills exhibited, by dimension (6) 
c. Total affective dispositions frequency (1) 
d. Total cognitive skills frequency (1) 
e. Global rating (1-5) for each category (13) 
f. Total global rating for cognitive skills (1) 
g. Total global rating for affective dispositions (1) 
 
Self-report measures (6) 
a. Affective disposition utilization self-report individual score (1) 
b. Affective disposition utilization self-report team score (1) 
c. Cognitive skills utilization self-report individual score (1) 
d. Cognitive skills utilization self-report team score (1) 
e. Team processes self report individual score (1) 
f. Team processes self report team score (1) 
  
 
Covariates (8) 
Personality (5) 
Age (1) 
Sex (1) 
Work experience (1) 
 
  
Figure 3 
Variables analyzed. 
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Discussion 
This study sought to shed light on the influence of cognitive skills and affective 
dispositions on team processes and outcomes on a critical-thinking task, to determine 
which if any of the dimensions of critical thinking are trainable, and to do it using 
objective measures when possible.  Since our subject matter expert was unknown to both 
participants and researchers and saw only the participants’ solutions, his or her ratings are 
very objective ratings of critical thinking from an outcome perspective.  A larger 
challenge is developing objective process measures.  The lack of a generally agreed-upon 
taxonomy of critical thinking made the development of behavior-based scoring much 
more difficult.  This study provides evidence of the potential value of behavioral 
observation in the study of critical thinking in teams. 
 Based on our subject matter expert outcome ratings, we found the cognitive and 
control groups provided better solutions to the scenario than did the affective group.  
Although not a significant difference, the “both” group tended toward the affective group.  
This may indicate a deleterious effect of the affective training (as both groups received 
it), or of the instruction to exhibit the characteristics described on their reminder cards.  
Affective dispositions are generally harder to understand and integrate than cognitive 
skills, and the additional attention required to implement the requested behavioral 
changes could have detracted from their ability to complete the task assigned. 
 In behavioral ratings, we found the affective dispositions group exhibited an 
overall score on truthseeking that was higher than the control group.  This finding 
suggests the affective dispositions training worked, that it increased the extent to which 
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the teams engaged in truthseeking.  If this difference was based solely on the affective 
dispositions training we would expect to see a significant difference between the affective 
dispositions group and the cognitive skills group, as they received no affective 
dispositions training.  A possible explanation for the lack of a significant difference is the 
high degree of overlap between the six cognitive skills dimensions and the truthseeking 
affective dispositions dimension.  The correlations range from .32 to .45 and are all 
significant at p=.05. 
In addition to the findings relating to the trainability and performance influence of 
cognitive skills and affective dispositions, this study developed a unique behavioral 
analysis technique in order to objectively measure the expression of cognitive skills and 
affective dispositions in group interactions. 
In the course of conducting this experiment several researchers noted that 
although the training sessions were somewhat tedious for all participants, they seemed to 
be especially arduous for those in the “both” condition.  Indeed, these participants were 
trained in cognitive skills followed immediately by training in affective dispositions 
whereas those in the “cognitive skills” or “affective dispositions” condition received one 
or the other, followed by training in conducting a job search or choosing college classes.  
We believe the different training programs were differentially relevant to the participants’ 
lives, and that this difference may have affected our ability to draw conclusions regarding 
the efficacy of our training program.  This difference can be seen in the responses to 
question 23 of the exit questionnaire (see appendix D), which asks participants to rate the 
degree to which they enjoyed the exercise.  There is a small but compelling trend, in 
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which the groups that received the most life-relevant training (the control group) enjoyed 
the experiment more than the groups that received no life-relevant training (the “both” 
condition), and the two groups that received one life-relevant training each were in 
between.  This effect did not achieve significance in our study but we believe a larger 
sample would find significant differences.  Future studies should take this into account 
when designing training for control groups. 
 The data from behavioral analysis are rich and can provide information that 
cannot be obtained through other means, particularly in the realms of collaborative 
critical thinking and team processes.  Though there is inherent value in the collection and 
analysis of critical thinking data independent of outcome measures, it is heartening to see 
such a high correlation (.80) with established measures of critical thinking.  This lends 
further credence to the behavioral method developed in this study, and to the taxonomy 
that underlies it.   
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Appendix A: Command and Control Fog Tactical Decision Game 
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Appendix B: Ambush at Dusk Tactical Decision Game 
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Appendix C: Personality Measure 
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Appendix E: Behavioral Rating Form 
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